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As with other cognitive faculties, the etiology of moral judgment and its connection to
early development is complex. Because research is limited, the causative and contributory
factors to the development of moral judgment in preverbal infants are unclear. However,
evidence is emerging from studies within both infant research and moral psychology that
may contribute to our understanding of the early development of moral judgments.Though
its ﬁnding are preliminary, this proposed paradigm synthesizes these ﬁndings to generate
an overarching model of the process that appears to contribute to the development of
moral judgment in the ﬁrst year of life. I will propose that through early interactions with the
caregiver, the child acquires an internal representation of a system of rules that determine
how right/wrong judgments are to be construed, used, and understood. By breaking moral
situations down into their deﬁning features, the attachment model of moral judgment
outlines a framework for a universal moral faculty based on a universal, innate, deep
structure that appears uniformly in the structure of almost all moral judgments regardless of
their content. The implications of the model for our understanding of innateness, universal
morality, and the representations of moral situations are discussed.
Keywords: moral judgment, moral development, mentalization, infant development, social cognition, attachment
theory
Recent research in moral psychology has produced strong evi-
dence to suggest that moral judgment is intuitive and is accom-
plished by a rapid, automatic, and unconscious psychological
process (Damasio, 1994; Shweder and Haidt, 1994; Greene and
Haidt, 2002; Hauser, 2006; Mikhail, 2011). This line of research
challenged the long-dominant cognitive development paradigm
conceived by Kohlberg (Piaget, 1965; Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel,
1983, 2006) according to which moral judgment is the product
of conscious, effortful reasoning.
There is, however, considerable disagreement and confusion
as to what moral intuitions are and how they work: what exactly
are the underlying cognitive processes of these judgments that
“operate quickly effortlessly and automatically, such that the out-
come but not the process is accessible to consciousness?” (Haidt,
2001, p. 818). How are moral situations represented in our minds?
What cognitive processes intuitively glue together different moral
situations to one category?
In this paper, my main concern will focus on moral violations
that involve harming others. Even though moral psychology and
philosophy are broader than harm violations, it is likely that judg-
ments about harm represent an important foundation of moral
judgment (Nichols, 2004).
I will suggest that the patterns of people’s moral intuitions
actually follow fairly straightforwardly from internally represented
principles or rules acquired in infancy. My assumption is that
moral judgment is a complex cognitive achievement that may rely
on a set of building block systems that appear early on in human
ontogeny andphylogeny. In this, I follow20 years of infant research
according to which the knowledge accumulated during the ﬁrst
year of life forms the foundation onwhich later learning, including
language acquisition, counting, object categorization, social rela-
tions, andother complex cognitive skills rests (Starkey andCooper,
1980; Wynn, 1990; Mandler and McDonough, 1998; Ensink and
Mayes, 2010). According to this view, “in order to understand
humans’ most complex cognitive skills, we should take a broad
view and study not only adults who have mastered the skills and
children who are acquiring them but also human infants and other
animals. Although no young child or nonhuman animal possess
these skills both exhibit many of the cognitive systems that serve
as their building blocks” (Spelke, 2000, p. 1233).
The idea that our moral sense is essentially connected to early
ties of dependency between the child and his or her caregiver is
not new. It was proposed by John Bowlby’s attachment theory
and Carol Gilligan’s ethics of care. Both theories emphasize the
importance to moral development of the early relations between
mother and infant (Bowlby, 1944, 1953, 1958, 1980; Gilligan, 1982;
Gilligan and Wiggins, 1987). However, the ideas of attachment
theory and ethics of care have not received the centrality in moral
psychology appropriate to their importance.
Until the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst century, the central
model in moral psychology was Kohlberg’s (1963a,b), according to
which moral development is dependent on moral reasoning and
on the growing cognitive faculties of the child at every stage of his
maturation. Such a model is not relevant when it comes to the
learning of moral principles in infancy prior to the development
of a child’s faculties for abstraction and logical thought. Since
the 1990s, moral psychology has radically changed its approach.
On the basis of numerous works of research in the ﬁeld, it was
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found that moral judgment is more a matter of emotion and affec-
tive intuition than deliberate reasoning (Greene and Haidt, 2002;
Hauser, 2006). In the 1990s, the affective revolutionwas reinforced
by a new focus on “automaticity”– the mind’s ability to solve
many problems, including high-level social ones, unconsciously
and automatically. This model suggests that moral judgments are
best thought of as affect-laden intuitions. This is because they
appear suddenly and effortlessly in consciousness, with an affec-
tive valence (good or bad), but without any feeling of having
gone through steps of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a
conclusion (Greene and Haidt, 2002).
I suggest that advances in our understanding of the nature of
moral judgment and the way affects organize the mind in the ﬁrst
year of life, offer us the opportunity to create closer ties between
Bowlby’s theory of attachment, ethics of care, and moral psychol-
ogy which were previously considered as belonging to separate
domains.
The idea is to use evidence from research in moral psychol-
ogy, infant research, and categorization, and then look at moral
situations from a phenomenological perspective to show patterns
and regularities. This integrated approach suggests that there is
a universal, innate, deep structure that appears uniformly in the
structure of almost all moral judgments indicating early origins.
This deep structure bears the mark of the infant-caregiver dyad as
the nucleus that is still present in the way adults represent moral
situations.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FIRST YEAR OF LIFE TO THE
DEVELOPMENT OF KNOWLEDGE
Over the past decade, neuroscientiﬁc data has been collated from
experiments involving both humans and animals (e.g., Teicher
et al., 2002; Francis et al., 2003; Meaney and Szyf, 2005; Parker and
Nelson, 2005). Though this data remains somewhat controversial
(e.g., Wolff, 1996; Green, 2000), it appears to show the signiﬁcant
inﬂuence of early childhood experiences on the development of
the brain and consequently its profound impact on social and
emotional development.
Over the past 20 years, as infant research has become increas-
ingly more sophisticated and complex, it has become clearer to
researchers that infants possess a much more intricate and far
richer knowledge of the world than had previously been assumed.
These studies proved that:
(a) In the ﬁrst year of life infants learn a great deal about the
physical world, about the nature of objects, how they move
and interact, and how they differ in their speciﬁc properties.
(Gelman, 1990; Mandler, 1992; Spelke et al., 1992; Baillargeon,
1993; Bertenthal, 1993). Several lines of research suggest that
at a very early stage in their development (3–6months), infants
may have ways of symbolizing basic kinds of social relations as
well as an ability to perceive and analyze social events that are
of signiﬁcance to them. Infants aged between 7 and 12 months
are able to understand that an action that is intentional is both
rational and directed at achieving a speciﬁc objective.
(b) That knowledge accumulated during the ﬁrst year of life forms
the foundation on which later learning, including language
acquisition, counting, object categorization, social relations,
and other complex cognitive skills, rests (Starkey and Cooper,
1980; Wynn, 1990; Mandler and McDonough, 1998; Ensink
and Mayes, 2010).
If that is so, then there is no reason for assuming that moral
development differs from the progress of other key cognitive facul-
ties. Given that dyadic interaction between infant and parent play
a crucial role in the early organization of the mind (Beebe and
Lachmann, 2002), there are grounds for assuming that this initial
phase plays a signiﬁcant role in the infant’s moral development,
and that basic processes of dyadic interaction may shed light on
how the infant learns the language of good and bad, right and
wrong.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FIRST YEAR TO THE
UNDERSTANDING OF RELATIONS AND TO MORAL
DEVELOPMENT
Whendoesmentalizationwithin themoral domain evolve in child-
hood, and what mental phenomena account for its appearance?
Jean Piaget in The Moral Judgment of the Child (1932/1965),
thought that mentalistic moral evaluation is a relatively late devel-
opmental achievement, emerging sometime around or after the
age of 7. Piaget thought that children are initially “moral realists”
who assign explicit blame based on objective states of the world,
like outcomes, rather than on subjective states of the mind, like
intentions. Yet, according to Hamlin (2013a), in the decades since
The Moral Judgment of the Child (1932) a large body of work
suggests that preverbal infants interpret agents’ object directed
actions in terms of their goal-relevant traits, suggesting that at
least some forms of mentalizing are present from early on in an
infant’s development. By 3–5 months of age, infants pay more
attention to events demonstrating mentalistic changes (changing
one’s mind), than to physical changes (changing one’s motion);
(see Woodward and Needham, 2009, for review).
In the moral domain, studies found that babies have an
intrinsic moral foundation – the ability and readiness to judge
what others do, a certain sense of justice, and an intuitive
response tomeanness. In several studies (Hamlin et al., 2007, 2010,
2011), infant participants between the ages of 6–10 months were
shown a simulated three dimensional geometric “puppet show”
in which geometric-shaped objects were used to role-play “help-
ing/hindering situations.” The “helper,” a yellow square, assisted
the circle up the hill; a red triangle (the “hinderer”), pushed the
circle down the hill. Following the infants’ observation of the“geo-
metric puppets,” the experimenter put the“helper”and“hinderer”
on a tray and took them to the child. The researchers made a
record of which of the two the child reached for, theorizing that
what an infant of that age would reach for would be a reliable
pointer to what he wants. The experiment revealed that 6- and
10-month-old infants consider an individual’s behavior toward
others when assessing that individual as either attractive or, alter-
natively, aversive. In other words, infants showed a clear preference
for an individualwhowasbeinghelpful to someone else as opposed
to one who placed obstacles in the path of another person. More-
over, the studies show that the participating infants preferred a
helpful individual to one who stood on the sidelines and the latter
to one who was obstructive.
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Hamlin (2013a), also utilizing a puppet-choice methodology,
provides evidence that 8-month-old infants incorporate, and even
privilege, intentions in their social evaluations. In contrast, 5-
month-old infants appear only able to distinguish characters who
intend the outcomes they cause. Such results suggest that one
requirement formaturemoral judgments, the ability to distinguish
between intentions and outcomes in morally relevant events, is
present by 8 months of age. Also, infants prefer individuals who
treat similar otherswell, and treat dissimilar others poorly (Hamlin
et al., 2013). It was also found that 16-month-olds are sensitive
to the pro- or antisocial behavior of a source that demonstrates
preference for two novel foods.
When deciding what to eat, infants took into account the
emotional reactions displayed by novel and previously prosocial
sources, but not those of antisocial sources (Hamlin and Wynn,
2012).
The researchers note that these social evaluations share at
least one crucial feature component with moral judgment: they
do not stem from an infant’s own experiences with the actors
involved. The infants themselves did not experience any con-
sequences resulting from these “wrongdoings.” Their evalua-
tions were made on the basis of witnessed interactions between
unknown individuals. The infant, as an unrelated unaffected third
party, is nonetheless making a judgment about the value of a
social act.
These experiments show that infants have a certain type of
knowledge that enables them to both distinguish between proper
and improper behavior and understand social relationships on a
basic level. Moreover, infants confronted with two novel agents
with opposing goals are able, on the basis of their relative
size, to anticipate the result of the ﬁrst contest for dominance
between them. Thus in their preverbal phase, it would seem
that infants have the capacity to conjure up a mental repre-
sentation of “dominance.” This representation uses an indicator
that includes a phylogenic scale, which is metaphorically applied
across all human cultures and languages to anticipate which of
the two novel agents is likely to come out on top. (Thomsen et al.,
2011).
However, the experiments tell us very little about theprocedures
or moral principles that infants learn, how they encode a moral
situation, and what representations they compare it to.
Maternal care is the likely stimulus that enables an adult’smoral
mechanism to develop. My assumption is that in precisely the same
way as an infant bornwith innate linguistic faculties will only learn
to speak if he grows up in the presence of people who speak to him,
he will develop moral faculties only if in his experience someone
else responds to his needs, takes care of him, and protects him at
some level.
Even though researches were aware of the fact that moral and
social faculties already begin to develop in the ﬁrst year of life, they
did not make room for, or place any importance on, the maternal
role in this development or even consider it. In most of the studies,
infants were still being perceived apart from their surroundings, as
if they possessed an isolated mind that was developing separately
from the environment in which they were growing up. For exam-
ple, Hamlin et al. (2007, 2010), posit that the capacity of infants
to evaluate individuals on the basis of their social interactions is
unlearned (Hamlin, 2013b). Bloom (2013) claims that we have an
in born moral sense that we spend the rest of our lives exercis-
ing in making judgments about good and evil. Likewise, Hoffman
(2000) thinks that the empathic and social faculties of infants
develop “naturally” without prior experience. Hamlin (2013a),
thinks that though it is unlikely that young infants themselves ben-
eﬁt extensively from the basic ability to distinguish friends from
foes, and arguably are too physically immature to proﬁt from such
an ability even if they had it, there are several examples of struc-
tures and capacities which emerge in development before they are
speciﬁcally required.
So, today, even though an infant’s social and empathic abil-
ities are a salient feature of any contemporary book on moral
development, the role of maternal care in such development was
not directly theorized upon. This lacuna has a long history in
moral psychology that stretches from Piaget and Kohlberg to con-
temporary moral psychology. And yet, infant research conducted
outside of moral psychology shows that out of all the inﬂuences
around him, the one that affects the new born the most is the
maternal care that he receives. Despite this consistent ﬁnding, the-
ories in moral development failed to integrate it in meaningful
ways.
WHAT DO INFANTS LEARN FROM THEIR INTERACTIONS
WITH THEIR MOTHERS?
There is a great deal of evidence that expectations of social rela-
tions emerge in the ﬁrst months of life through infant-caregiver
interactions. Beebe and Lachmann (2002), suggest that in the
same way that infants categorize faces, shapes, objects, colors, and
animals, they also form schemas or categories of interpersonal
interactions (see Beebe and Stern, 1977; Stern, 1985; Beebe and
Lachmann, 1988). A principle called ongoing regulations between
mother and infant (Beebe and Lachmann, 2002) provides themost
basic rule for organizing representations. The predictable ongo-
ing regulations in mother–infant interactions create expectancies
that organize the infant’s experience. The neonate detects “con-
tingencies,” expected relationships between his own behavior and
the environment’s reaction to it. An infant develops an ability to
anticipate when something is likely to happen and an expectation
that what he does has consequences. Thus, a remarkable set of
pre-symbolic representational capacities exists in an infant’s ﬁrst
year (Stern, 1985; Beebe and Lachmann, 2002). The infant can
sense whether or not the caregiver is acting contingently, and can
determine whether behavior patterns are similar or different. The
infant develops expectations of these patterns, remembers them,
and categorizes them.
These anticipated outcomes are organized in terms of time,
space, affect, and arousal. This is the equipment the baby uses
to develop pre-symbolic representations of standard interactions
well before language develops.
What is important here to emphasize is that in the early stages
of life, infants do not learn at the level of content. They learn
procedures, patterns of interaction, and a shared system of rules
for maintaining the management of joint actions in the ﬁrst year
of life. (See for example: Bakeman and Brown, 1977; Bruner,
1977, 1983; Stern, 1985, 2002; Cohn and Tronick, 1989; Tronick,
1989).
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THE ATTACHMENT APPROACH TO MORAL JUDGMENT: A
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF
MORAL SITUATIONS
In order to establish the link between early infancy and the acqui-
sition of basic moral faculties, we must be capable of deﬁning:
(1) the appropriate stimulus that is likely to lead to the learning of
the proper processes by which moral judgment is exercised and,
(2) the deep structures that are common to the entire range of
moral situations, including the link between those structures and
the initial stimulus that made moral learning possible.
How can these assertions be tested?
There is no direct evidence of the way in which infants learn
moral principles, just as there is no direct evidence of the way in
which infants learn the deep structures of language. Therefore, we
must discover the deep structures of moral situations and then
look into the way in which these are linked to the ﬁrst year of life.
The goal is to posit the most minimal set of assumptions that
can still account for various moral judgments and situations.
THE DYAD SUPERIORITY EFFECT OF MORAL SITUATIONS:
GRAY’S FINDINGS
The features of moral situations to be discussed are simple and
obvious. It will quickly become apparent that, paradoxically, due
to their basic, simple and intuitive nature, these features go mostly
unnoticed. As a result, we hardly discern them or give them much
thought.
Wewill want to understandwhat characteristics differentmoral
situations have in common. How do people recognize moral
situations and notice regularities within them? What are these
regularities? How are moral situations represented in our minds?
What kind of categorization do we use when processing a moral
judgment?
What then is the most invisible and yet the most salient
characteristic of a moral situation?
The fundamental unit of moral situations is the dyad. I term
this phenomenon the dyad-superiority effect of moral situa-
tions. Essentially this means that moral situations are mentally
represented as two parties in conﬂict.
We have strong support for the dyadic nature of moral
situations. A series of studies by Gray et al. (2012), showed
that moral judgments do not depend merely on the superﬁ-
cial properties of moral events but also on how those events
are mentally represented. Gray conducted a large-scale sur-
vey which investigated speciﬁc links between mind perception
and morality. Respondents evaluated both the mental capac-
ities of diverse targets (e.g., adult humans, babies, animals,
God) and their moral standing (Gray et al., 2007). In particu-
lar, participants assessed whether target entities deserved moral
rights and whether they possessed moral responsibility. The
mind survey revealed that people perceive minds along two
independent dimensions. The ﬁrst dimension, experience, is
the perceived capacity for sensation and feelings (e.g., hunger,
fear, pain, pleasure, and consciousness). The second, agency, is
the perceived capacity to intend and to act (e.g., self-control,
judgment, communication, thought, and memory). An entity
can be high on both dimensions (e.g., adult humans), low on
experience and high on agency (e.g., God, Google), high on
experience and low on agency (e.g., children, animals), or low
on both (e.g., the deceased, inanimate objects). The mind sur-
vey demonstrates key connections between mind perception and
morality.
Gray found that the essenceof moral judgment is theperception
of two complementary minds – a dyad of an intentional moral
agent and a suffering moral patient. One of Gray’s most important
ﬁndings is that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template
of two perceived minds – a moral dyad of an intentional agent and
a suffering moral patient (Gray and Wegner, 2009).
Agency qualiﬁes entities as moral agents – capable of doing
good or evil – whereas experience qualiﬁes entities as moral
patients – capable of beneﬁting from good or suffering from evil.
Adult humans usually possess both agency and patiency, and can
therefore be both blamed for evil and suffer from it. A puppy,
according to Gray, is a mere moral patient; we seek to protect him
from harm but do not blame him for injustice.
Gray posits that despite the variety of moral transgressions,
the moral dyad not only integrates across various moral trans-
gressions but also serves as a working model for understanding
the moral world. This dyadic template ﬁts the majority of moral
situations because mind perception is as ﬂexible as moral judg-
ment itself. A dyadic template of morality suggests that people
are categorized as either moral agents or moral patients – a
phenomenon called moral typecasting. Moral typecasting also
inﬂuences our perception of the target person’s mind. When
someone is categorized as a moral agent, observers automati-
cally infer the capacity for agency. This means that simply doing
something good or evil can bring with it corresponding attribu-
tions of intention, especially evil intentions (Knobe, 2003; see
Gray and Wegner, 2009). Likewise, when someone is catego-
rized as a moral patient, people automatically infer the capacity
for experience and greater sensitivity to pain (Gray and Wegner,
2009).
Gray posits that the essence of morality is expressed by the
combination of harmful intent and painful experience. If so, acts
committed by agents with greater intent and that result in more
suffering should be judged as more immoral.
Following Gary, I suggest that a dyadic structure is the most
common trait of moral situations. A dyad is present in the back-
ground of every moral situation regardless of whether it involves
many parties, or a group (several individuals, large groups, or even
nation states).
Second, the bedrock of most moral judgments is an observer
examining a dyad. The word “observer” is, in a sense, mislead-
ing because people make moral judgments both as observers and
as participants. I use the word “observer” only for demonstra-
tive purposes. At this stage, I am interested in understanding
what leads us to judge theft or medical negligence as a wrongful
act, rather than the way in which the thief or his victim judge
the situation. This also resembles the experiments of infants’
moral judgment (Hamlin et al., 2007, 2010) in which infants
were observers. Thus, within a basic moral judgment situation
three sides are involved: two conﬂicting parties (a dyad) and an
observer.
O relates to the following dyad: A→ C
O – Observer
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A Perceived wrongdoer
C Perceived victim
→ Behavior, Harm done, Overall attitude of A to C
In the following examples I demonstrate how moral situations
remain constant in their dyadic structure across a wide range of
moral dilemmas of entirely different content and associative nets.
Thequestionmark signiﬁes that themoral judgment is in question.
(a) Murder/Manslaughter case
Did John kill David in cold blood or did David provoke him
prior to the killing?
Observer (O) relates to the following dyad:
(A) David → (?) (C) John.
(b) Bombing civilians in self-defense
Does a state have the right to bomb civilian neighborhoods
in a neighboring state from which militants have ﬁred rockets
into its territory killing civilians?
Observer (O) relates to the following dyad:
(A) State’s army → (?) (C) Civilians of neighboring state.
(c) Medical negligence case
Were the medical complications suffered by the patient after
surgery caused by the physician’s negligence?
Observer (O) relates to the following dyad:
(A) Physician → (?) (C) Sick patient
Note that the questions relate to different issues. Some, like
those relating to medical negligence cases are questions about
facts. Others are questions about personal beliefs and val-
ues. The bombing of civilians in populated areas from which
missiles were ﬁred raises especially important issues. As is
the case with many other moral dilemmas, the observer has
to choose between two conﬂicting sides which I have chosen
to represent in this instance by the letters A and C. Many
serious moral dilemmas arise from a conﬂict between two
or more deeply felt obligations pulling in opposite directions
toward two parties each of which is perceived as having been
harmed.
In fact, in such situations two dyads are presented to the mind:
(A) State’s army → (?) (C) Civilians of neighboring state.
And
Militias → (?) (C) Civilians of state (A)
Thus, the process of reaching a judgment involves deciding
which party you side with. In order for a judgment to be made,
one of the dyads has to succeed in capturing the observer’s mind
while the other is discarded.
This example shows that the complex social reality provides us
with moral dilemmas that are manifestly more complex than a
simple dyadic component.
However, dealing with these dilemmas can only be accom-
plished by breaking down their complexity into simple sub
dyads.
I suggest that the process of construing a dyad when presented
with social information about conﬂict, probably occurs at a very
early stage in the processing of information; that several pieces
of information relating to each party can be evaluated simulta-
neously; and that the basic process is fast, unintentional, efﬁcient
and occurs outside awareness.
DECODING MORAL SITUATIONS
Thus far we have seen that breaking down a moral situation into
a basic dyad enables us to deal with a vast amount of complex
material relatively quickly.
Our judgment of different dyads seems to be fairly ﬂexible and
encompasses an astonishing range of situations. In fact, one of
the most striking facts about our human morality is that people
can morally judge an unlimited number of dyads on an unlimited
numbers of topics.
In this section I will attempt to unravel the procedures whereby
the moral judgment is reached.
Given the enormous amount of data that exists in relation to
any given moral dyad, how do we organize the information for a
particular perceived dyad? How do we extract a judgment from
the basic features of A, C, and →?
It is probably the case that in the process of forming a
moral judgment the moral dyad that appears in our minds
is evaluated against some prior knowledge we possess about
dyads. My assumption is that we can only make a moral
judgment if, in our minds, we hold some reliable form of
prior knowledge representation of the moral situation, a men-
tal form for what we know about conﬂicts in our social
environment.
Thus, I assume that we deal with moral situations in the
same way we deal with other concepts. We categorize the situ-
ation as moral and then judge it according to the pre-existing
representation it most closely resembles (Hahn and Ramscar,
2001).
Before describing the primary component of that dyad, it is
important to understand what criteria are most often applied in
judging moral situations. Intentionality and controllability seem
to be crucial for moral judgments. There is a consensus among
professional and lay evaluators of human behavior that to praise
or blame an agent, the agent must have acted intentionally, with
foresight of the consequences, and must have caused the outcome
(Shaver, 1985; Schlenker et al., 1994; Alicke, 2000; Weiner, 2006;
Alicke and Rose, 2010). Full responsibility inferences require inter-
nal and controllable causality, intent, and the absence of mitigating
circumstances.
My contention is that the various components of a moral situa-
tion such as intentionality, controllability, personal responsibility
and free will, have an additional layer of representational content
that hasn’t been noticed by social psychologists. They are sec-
ondary features. They represent something more primary, more
basic.
The key underlying thesis that I will present is that the most
informative features of moral judgments – intent, free will and
controllability – are underpinned by a more profound feature –
our knowledge about infants (or children) and adults.
We have an affective and cognitive mechanism that is highly
sensitive to the distinctions between child-like and adult-like
traits. As we will see, these traits are highly informative for our
understanding of others.
The same parameters that are crucial to the attribution of
responsibility for a wrongdoing (intentionality, controllability and
free will) are those that are crucial to the distinction between
children and adults.
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I suggest that we represent each of the parties (A, C) in ways
that are comparable to our representation of children and adults.
All our efforts are geared to construct the reality of the moral
situation in terms of an adult–child dyad. Judgments placing the
parties on the child–adult spectrum, come to mind quickly and
effortlessly, seemingly popping out of nowhere, without much
conscious awareness of their origins or of the manner of their
formation.
REPRESENTATIONS OF CHILD-LIKE AND ADULT-LIKE TRAITS
To simplify things, I will use here the theory of schematic repre-
sentation (Rumelhart and Ortnoy, 1977) as a simple model for
understanding moral judgments. I have chosen schemas because
they are often more task-oriented than exemplars or prototypes
and are less concerned with recognition and classiﬁcation. Rather,
a schema is a mental framework for organizing important knowl-
edge, creating a meaningful structure of related concepts based
on prior experiences. Therefore, schemas seem more appropriate
to the moral domain which involves not merely recognition and
classiﬁcation but also organizing material in a particular way.
Schemas have received signiﬁcant empirical support from stud-
ies in psycholinguistics and cognitive psychology (Bartlett, 1932,
1958; Rumelhart and Ortnoy, 1977; Mandler, 1984; Komatsu,
1992).
Construing the two conﬂicting parties as a child–adult dyad
probably activates a particular schema that is common to most
people, and sufﬁciently wide ranging to be applicable to a broad
variety of speciﬁc moral situations.
HOW DO WE JUDGE A CONFLICTED DYAD?
The basic idea is that non-conscious judgments of a dyad
are formed automatically, effortlessly, ubiquitously and rapidly,
before any conscious processing has taken place. In generat-
ing a non-conscious moral judgment, we perform two mental
operations:
(a) Evaluating the child-like and the adult-like characteristics of
each party and deciding, if we are able to, which of the parties
matches an adult schema and which a child schema. As we
will see, the most salient feature that differentiates between
children and adults is dependency.
(b) Evaluating the relationship between the adult and child-like
parties in terms of (→) where → is the symbol for the harm
done and the overall relation of the independent vis-a- vis
the dependent in a particular dyad. That is, we do not have
schemas only for children and adults.
We also possess a schema for the dyadic relation, centered on
our knowledge of adult obligations to children. So the moral judg-
ment is much more than an evaluation of the harm done. It is the
evaluation of the overall attitude of A to C based on our prior
expectations of how adults should treat children.
THE EVALUATION OF THE CHILD-LIKE AND ADULT-LIKE
CHARACTERISTICS OF EACH PARTY
The evaluation of the moral situation is a derivative of our inner
schemas of children (dependents) and adults (independents). In
our minds, different expectations, feelings, cognitions, and mental
images, are associated with children and adults.
For example, we are emotionally much more responsive to the
suffering of children than to that of adults.
Dijker (2001), showed wounded bodies of people of different
ages all supposedly involved in a car accident. It was found that
toddlers are seen as more vulnerable than pre-adolescents who, in
turn, are viewed as more vulnerable than adults. Elderly persons
are perceived as more vulnerable than adults but not as vulnerable
as toddlers.
The fact that the reactivity to old people’s suffering is also high
shows that age, as an isolated characteristic, is not the crucial issue.
Rather it is the victim’s child-like/dependent/vulnerable/weak
quality- in this instance among elderly people.
Strong emotional reactivity to children’s and infants’ suffering
is not the only thing that distinguishes theway inwhichwe relate to
children and adults. Apparently children and adults are identiﬁed
by separate schemas that also involve cognitions and attributions.
Children are perceived as weak, needy, helpless, lacking control,
vulnerable, dependent on others, and unable to take care of others.
These traits have profound implications on our attributions and
moral judgments.
Given our schemas for children, in our cognitive system
infants/children (dependents):
Cannot discriminate between right and wrong.
Are less responsible for their actions even when those actions
are harmful.
Are not fully aware of the consequences of their behavior.
Do not intend to harm (in the way adults do).
Do not control the happenings in which they are involved.
Cannot take care of someone else who is in need.
Are helpless to the extent that their basic needs have to be
supplied by a caregiver in order for them to survive.
Usually evoke positive feelings of tenderness, caring, and
empathy, when they are distressed.
Thus, for example, when an infant scratches his mother’s face
or lets a full glass of water fall off the table, we don’t consider him
as having consciously intended to cause the damage.
According to our schemas for adults (independents), the very
opposite set of propositions is true. We think that unlike children,
adults have personal control of their behavior, do discriminate
between right and wrong, and are responsible for their actions.
In the process of moral judgment the more someone matches
a child-like schema (C), the less likely it is that the observer will:
Have a high assessment of intentionality, controllability, fore-
sight, free will and causation.
Hold him responsible for his actions.
Tend to think that he has acted of his own free will.
Respond to him negatively.
And the more likely it is that the observer will:
Understand his behavior and forgive his wrongdoing.
Be more sensitive to his suffering.
Alternatively, the more someone in a moral situation matches
an adult-like schema (A) the more likely it is that the observer will:
Have a high assessment of intentionality, controllability, fore-
sight, free will and causation.
Hold him responsible for his actions.
Consider him to have acted with intent, deliberation, premed-
itation and malice.
Frontiers in Psychology | Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology January 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 6 | 6
“fpsyg-05-00006” — 2014/1/30 — 12:34 — page 7 — #7
Govrin The ABC of moral development
Not forgive or understand A’s wrongdoing.
Be less sympathetic to A’s suffering.
The two schemas are different points of location on one con-
tinuum that can encompass a large variety of situations. The
schemas are ﬁxed around deﬁning features of adults and chil-
dren such as big/small, weak/strong, vulnerable/ resistant, help-
less/powerful, dependent /independent, knowingly/unknowingly,
responsible/irresponsible. The schemas are broad enough to
handle endless variations of these themes. I suggest that when
facing a moral situation, the mind uses these schemas to select and
organize the information that will most effectively aid us in the
judgment process.
As I stated above, it is important to note that the schemaswe use
in evaluating each party are not related to how children and adults
really are. Parents, teachers, and anyone who has early memories
of what it is like to be a child, realize that children can at times
be cruel, aggressive and hostile toward other children and adults.
Numerous studies have demonstrated that from an early age the
aggressive behavior of children is expressed in all sorts of different
ways (Crick, 1996; Crick et al., 1997).
Adult-like or child-like dimensions are not necessarily related
to speciﬁc age but to the quality of a person or interaction. To
put it more accurately, we are looking for cues of dependency
and independency. For example, people unconsciously associate
disability with child-like features (Robey et al., 2006). For example,
college students spoke to otherswho they believed to be adultswith
disabilities much as they did to the 12-year-old child (Liesener and
Mills, 1999).
In attributing child-like features, age is not important per se
but as a sign of dependency/ independency. Parents who become
angry with a 3-year-old child who is pulling at his baby sister’s
hair, and who threaten to punish him, believe that the child is
sufﬁciently independent to be capable of restraining himself, show
sensitivity toward his sister, and stop harassing her. They regard
him as responsible and able to exercise self-control and free will.
Under these circumstances a 3-year-old is recognized as A.
As shown in Figure 1, there are at least three possible ways
by which we decide who the dependent is and who the indepen-
dent: role (diagram 1), personal characteristics (diagram 2), and
harmful act (diagram 3).
The“detection”of child-like and adult-like characteristics is not
entirely rational andnot always relevant. For example, a number of
experiments (Berry and Zebrowitz-McArthur, 1985) indicate that
baby-faced people are less likely to lose their case than people con-
sidered to have a mature face (Berry and Zebrowitz-McArthur,
1988; Zebrowitz and McDonald, 1991). However, this inﬂuence
also appears to depend on the nature of the offense. A baby-
faced defendant will be considered less likely to have committed
an offense intentionally, and more likely to have committed an
offense by negligence than a defendant with a mature face.
The evaluation of child-like and adult-like characteristics in a
particular moral situation is observer relative. The same person in
a particular dyad might be construed as A by one person and as
C by another. In fact, construing the parties as C or A is the dom-
inant act of moral judgment. If party X matches an adult schema
(A), and party Y matches a child schema (C), it means that we
think X has done harm to Y and that we sympathize with C and
condemnA. But this is only true for an observer that perceives X as
adult-like andY as child-like. So, child-like and adult-like schemas
are not just cognitive assessments of traits. They incorporate our
emotions, judgments, and actions toward the parties.
Whilst the decision as to which party is C or A is highly sub-
jective, the general traits within us that are associated with children
and those associated with adults are constant and universal. That is
to say, our schemas for dependents and independents are the basic
building blocks of a universal morality. These schemas are used
differently by different cultures and peoples and yet one cannot
construct a moral judgment without them.
EVALUATING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ADULT-LIKE
AND CHILD-LIKE PARTY (→)
Even if we match each party to adult and child schemas, the judg-
ment remains incomplete. We do not simply compare the two
parties individually and decide which one is more helpless, need-
ier, or more powerful. Our judgment depends on something much
more profound. It is linked to the nature of the dyadic relations.
Just as we have different schemas for adults and children, so we
have a schema for the dyadic relations between them.
This representation consists of our expectations of what
adults should and should not do to children. Adults have
FIGURE 1 | Constructing dyads. The sudden appearance in
consciousness of a moral judgment ﬁrst involves construing two
asymmetric parties as child-like (dependent) and adult-like
(independent). We construct these categories according to particular
cues such as the responsible role of one party toward the other
(diagram 1), personal characteristics of each party, or according to
a particular interaction (diagram 2), or the harmful act itself
(diagram 3).
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obligations toward children andwe seem to know these obligations
intuitively.
The question that needs to be asked is this: how did the per-
ceived adult-like party relate to the child-like party during their
interaction? This criterion only concerns the perceived adult-like
party (A) since we infer from our schema for the child–adult dyad
that children are not expected to take care of anyone. That is why
the moral situation is construed as A → C and not A ↔ C or
C →A. The one-way direction signiﬁes the asymmetry between C
andA. Thus, in the course of evaluating each party’s characteristics
as child-like and adult-like, much weight is given to the evaluation
of A’s actions and his awareness of the dependency of the other
party (see Figure 2).
Let us turn again to another one of our earlier examples –
medical negligence. Was the physician’s negligence responsible for
the medical complications suffered by the patient after surgery?
A quick and effortless analysis reveals that the physician
matches the adult schema and the patient the child schemabecause
the sick patient depends on the physician and not the other
way around. The dyad therefore consists of a physician mentally
construed as A, and a patient mentally construed as C.
However, the judgment process is not complete without the
evaluation of →. In the next evaluative stage our prior expecta-
tions of A in the presence of C become activated and interact with
whatwe know about doctors and their obligations toward patients.
Only if the physician’s actions failed to meet our expectations of
adults in the presence of children will we judge the case to be one
of negligence.
We compare a doctor’s actions with our expectations of him: he
should examine the patient thoroughly; he shouldn’t opt for med-
ical procedures that will endanger the patient’s life; he shouldn’t
leave the operation in the middle of a procedure because he has
to get to a show in the evening. Our entire moral judgment might
FIGURE 2 |The attachment model of moral judgment. In generating a
non-conscious moral judgment, we perform two mental operations: we
impose a dyadic structure of child–adult/agent–patient (Gray et al., 2012) on
two parties in conﬂict and we compare the behavior of A toward C with our
prior expectations of what adults should and should not do to children. Acts
that violated our expectations are judged as morally wrong. Whilst the
decision as to which party is C or A is highly subjective, the general traits
that are associated with children and those associated with adults are
constant and universal.
change if it transpired that the doctor’s negligence resulted from
him having had a heart attack during surgery. In such circum-
stances hemaybeperceived as highly dependent andhis negligence
may be viewed less severely.
CONSTRAINTS
In the process of forming moral judgments, especially in severe
harm norm violations, the observer will have contrasting cog-
nitions and emotions toward each of the parties to the conﬂict
(see Figure 3). A mental representation of A → C clearly directs
our cognitions and emotions. A constraint is a kind of rule
that places extra conditions on dyadic structures. When the
moral judgment is unambiguous and the harm is judged as
serious, the observer will experience negative emotions such as
blame and rage toward A, and positive feelings such as com-
passion, empathy, and pity toward C. The affective response
matches a set of cognitive convictions related to the question
of which party is wrong, needs help, deserves punishment etc.
Observers might react with different levels of emotional inten-
sity because individuals differ in their sensitivity to these vital
cues of wrongdoing. However, both affect and cognition will fol-
low one ﬁxed, particular, direction. Construing the two parties as
A → C imposes constraints that moral judgment must necessarily
satisfy.
Suppose the mind is presented with the following information:
“a man stole money from a poor, elderly woman.” The observer
construes the situation as:
Man →elderly woman Stealing
The implication of construing the moral situation in this man-
ner is that the observer’s affective system responds by feeling sorry
and showing concern for the elderly woman and/or by condemn-
ing the burglar. Some observers might respond with sorrow or
extreme rage; others will be completely indifferent, and most will
react moderately. Of course, numerous personal, social, contex-
tual, and cultural elements determine the observer’s response and
its intensity. For the moment, however, I want to concentrate on
the fact that though people differ in the intensity of their affective
response, the direction of both the affective and the cognitive reac-
tion is similar if, and only if, the observer construed the situation
as A → C.1
1For example itmay be that theman’smotherwould not condemnher son in theway
that an impartial observer would because her love for her son makes it impossible
for her to construe him as A (perpetrator).
FIGURE 3 |The mental representation of A→ C CONSTRAINTS our
cognitions and emotions. Once people construe the parties as A → C,
the pattern of moral judgment follows a speciﬁc direction to the exclusion
of all others.
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Once people construe the burglar and the oldwoman asA→C,
the pattern of moral judgment becomes ﬁxed and constant. Peo-
ple will not condemn the elderly woman and empathize with the
burglar. Therefore, the negative and positive feelings, as well as the
feelings of those who remain relatively indifferent, follow a speciﬁc
direction to the exclusion of all others.
Contrary to what the accounts of sentimentalists or intuition-
ists may argue (Prinz, 2007; Haidt, 2010) our moral judgments,
unlike our esthetic tastes, are not arbitrary. Even when they lead to
contradictory conclusions, they are not entirely ﬂexible. Though it
can be said that the construing of moral judgment is tolerant and
allows for diverse cultural and personal projections, it is not the
case that each and every projection will be perceived as sensible
and/or acceptable. A dyad will allow certain projections and block
others if, and only if, it is construed as A → C. Moral judgments are
therefore constrained by rules that are guided by the knowledge we
have as to how dyads should function and work. Our expectations
of perceived independents in the presence of dependents impose
extrinsic requirements on our moral judgments.
The greater the harm norm violation, the more the parties
become polarized on the child-like and adult-like continuum. The
more theperceived adult-like partyhas failed to fulﬁll anobligation
toward the child-like party, the more the judgment of him will
tend to be negative. However, the more either one of the parties,
or both, are viewed as possessing a mixture of child and adult-like
characteristics, the more ambiguous will be the judgment.
The general idea is that moral judgment involves computing
child-like and adult-like characteristics. This process is almost
reﬂex-like: it is fast in operation and automated so that, for
instance, one cannot help taking into account the child-like face
of an adult, the young age of a thief, or the unintended harm of an
accidental killing.
THE NEURAL WORKING OF MORAL JUDGMENTS: TWO
TENTATIVE SUGGESTIONS
MORAL JUDGMENT AND THE HUMAN VISUAL SYSTEM
If humans treated every new right-wrong situation as a new and
unique experience, we would quickly drown in a bafﬂing and con-
fusing state of mind. The attachment approach to moral judgment
suggests that to improve the situation, the cognitive system groups
moral situations into the meaningful category of the A → C
format. The various parts of the moral situations are perceived
holistically rather than separately or independently. The different
features of moral situations such as intention, harm, asymmetry of
force, child like/ adult-like characteristics of each party, are incor-
porated within the whole format of A → C. If David used a pistol
to kill John in cold blood then the taking of life, the intentional
act and the asymmetry of force, lead the different elements of
this dyad to be grouped into a severe moral violation. This judg-
ment has properties (such as strong condemnation of David) not
possessed by any individual element.
Gray et al. (2012), suggest that if our template of morality is
dyadic – perceived intentional moral agent and a suffering moral
patient –we shouldbe compelled to complete themoral dyadwhen
it appears incomplete. For example, when we see someone blame-
worthy – an apparent moral agent – we should complete the dyad
by inferring the presence of another mind to which is suffering – a
moral patient. Gray suggests the phenomenon of dyadic comple-
tion occurs at an intuitive level – like the Gestalt completion. Here
are some examples of dyadic completion Gray cites. In one study,
participants received electric shocks that were administered either
intentionally or accidentally, and though the shocks were identical
in voltage, the more intentional (and blameworthy) shocks were
experienced as physically more painful (Gray and Wegner, 2008).
This increased experience of pain from intentional shocks also
translates into increased skin conductance responses (Gray et al.,
2012). Intentions are so strongly linked to culpability that even
irrelevant intentions can increase judgments of culpability. For
example, people forced to kill others at gunpoint are perceived as
moremorallywrongwhen theywanted themandead, even though
they had no choice (Woolfolk et al., 2006). Unrelated bad inten-
tions can also make an act blameworthy. Alicke (1992) found that
people attribute more culpability for ignoring a stop sign when
the driver is hurrying home to hide drugs rather than to hide an
anniversary present for his wife.
It is unknown what neurobiological framework can account
for the dyadic completion. Most cognitive psychological moral
theories are formal and detached from neuroscience. I suggest
that much can be gained by taking advantage of the large amount
of information available on the neurophysiology of visual recog-
nition. Although moral judgments and visual recognition are
separate unrelated domains, what might be of interest to us is the
ability of the brain to complete missing elements so that recog-
nition remains largely unaffected by such obstacles. Basically, the
thinking is that visual images constructed by the brain are holistic-
i.e., are far abovewhat is expected from the linear sumof individual
components. Human brain imaging research has strongly sup-
ported suchholistic aspects by showing that one cannot explain the
neuronal activity measured in high order visual areas in response
to a picture as a sum of the responses to the picture elements.
Although visual recognition is a perceptual phenomenon, it can
also be viewed as an ubiquitous property of various types of neural
network models (Williams and Jacobs, 1997; Ullman, 1998). Such
networks, upon presentation of a partial input pattern, can settle
quite rapidly into an attractor state corresponding to the complete
stored pattern (Lerner et al., 2002).
Studies point to the lateral occipital complex (LOC), as a cen-
tral site in which object completion effects are manifested. In one
study (Lerner et al., 2002), subjects were presentedwith three types
of images: (i) whole line drawings of animal or unfamiliar shapes
(“whole”); (ii) the same shapes, occluded by parallel stripes which
occupied roughly half of the surface area of the images (“grid”);
and (iii) the same stripes, “scrambled” so that the relative posi-
tion of the regions between the stripes was changed while the local
feature structure remained intact (scrambled). Behavioral mea-
surements showed a high degree of object completion in the“grid”
condition, but not in the “scrambled” condition. The functional
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) results show a signiﬁcantly
higher activation of the “grid” images compared to the “scram-
bled”images in the LOC.Other studies show that infants only a few
months old complete representations of objects behind occluders
(Kellman and Spelke, 1983), and psychophysical experiments on
adults suggest that such completed representations determine the
allocation of visual attention (He and Nakayama, 1992).
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Taken together, these results make important progress in situ-
ating the LOC on a continuum of possible shape computations:
after contour completion, border ownership, and invariance to
form cues, size and position are attained (Kourtzi and Kanwisher,
2001). It is plausible to think that in the same way that areas in
the brain play a critical role in object completion, other areas are
dominant in the completion of the dyadic Gestalt.
But moral judgment is much more dynamic and complicated
than object recognition and encompasses a huge amount of com-
putations of various kinds. How does the neural code for moral
situations take into account so many considerations in such a
short time to form an holistic impression? How does the holistic
judgment emerge?
CONNECTIONISM
According to the proposed model, moral judgments are accom-
plished by a dynamical system in which they gradually emerge
through ongoing cycles of interaction between evaluations
of the two parties and their relations in terms of (depen-
dency/independency, weak/strong/ like-me, not like-me, inten-
tional/unintentional, mild harm/severe harm etc.). Thus, multiple
sources of information – both bottom-up cues and top-down fac-
tors – powerfully interact and integrate over time to producemoral
judgments.
The end-result of these evaluations is to determine who is A,
who is C, and what kind of violation happened between the two.
As such, this system permits lower-level sensory perception and
higher-order social cognition to continuously coordinate across
multiple interactive levels of processing to give rise to stable moral
judgments.
What model of the brain can describe such a hypothesis? Some
researchers (Hopﬁeld, 1982; Rumelhart et al., 1986; Thagard, 1989,
2000; Harman et al., 2010; Freeman and Ambady, 2011) have
argued that a connectionist network model possibly provides us
with awayof explaininghowpeople reach judgments about others.
Dynamical systems, such as a recurrent connectionist network of
the human brain, are powerful in their ability to integrate multiple
simultaneous sources of information. In a recurrent connection-
ist network, there are a number of nodes with connections that
can be positive (excitatory) or negative (inhibitory). Positive links
connect one set of nodes to other nodes so that as one of the nodes
becomes more excited, its excitation increases the excitation of the
other nodes (Freeman andAmbady, 2011). Conversely, as the exci-
tation of one such node lessens, or is in receipt of negative levels of
excitation, the excitation of the other nodes is lessened. Negative
links connect nodes so that as one node receives more excitation,
the others receive less, and vice versa. When applied to elements in
a moral situation positive and negative excitation cycles will cir-
culate in the network and a steady state will be achieved resulting
in a full gestalt of the moral situation as A → C.
Because a node’s activation is a function of all the positive and
negative connections to other nodes that are activated in parallel,
the ﬁnal activation of a node (i.e., at the point at which the sys-
tem stabilizes) can be thought of as the satisfaction of multiple
constraints. In a connectionist model, each connection between
nodes is a constraint (Freeman and Ambady, 2011). For instance,
a node representing the category baby face might excite and be
excited by another node representing the cognition “wrongdoing
was unintentional.” When these two nodes are incorporated in a
larger recurrent network that is stimulated by, for instance, a baby
face, this baby face – unintentional connection between nodes
serves as a constraint on the network. That is, for the network to
ever achieve stability, activation must ﬂow through that connec-
tion and incorporate it into an overall stable pattern that includes
all other nodal connections.
Thus, nodes in a recurrent network constrain each other in
ﬁnding the best overall pattern that is consistent with the input.
Such a model of a connectionist network can explain how one
single component of a dyad inﬂuences the other components.
For example, many studies have proved that in cases in which
the severe harm was entirely accidental, people are nevertheless
willing to say that the agent is culpable and that the severe harm
caused is his responsibility (for a review and meta-analysis, see
Robbennolt, 2000).We can understand this by assuming that a cer-
tain component of the dyad, in this case severe harm and extreme
suffering, strongly activates the other nodes and skews them in a
certain direction. Again we are confronted by the role of dyadic
Gestalt: when harm done is moderate that node is less active so
that attribution of responsibility lessens.
Serious moral dilemmas can also be explained by a connec-
tionist model. These dilemmas require relatively high levels of
cognitive processing because the victim is associated with a perpe-
trator and the perpetrator is associated with a victim. Thus each
side sort of blocks a clear cut moral judgment (see Figure 4).
The process involves a dynamic competition between victim–
perpetrator representations (“they are victims but at the same
time perpetrators”) which continuously compete. The bombing
of civilians in Dresden in World War II, using harsh interrogation
methods against terrorists, and policemen bullying cruel crimi-
nals, are some of the cases in which moral judgment is effortful
and requires a great deal of processing.
For the system to settle into a stable state (e.g., reach a
ﬁnal moral judgment) the parallel and partially active Victim
FIGURE 4 | Representation of difficult moral judgment. In many difﬁcult
moral judgments, such as the bombing of civilians in Dresden in World War
II, or the use of harsh methods of interrogation against terrorists, the
victims are associated with the perpetrators and the perpetrators are
associated with the victims. This induces a strong competition between
perpetrator–victim category nodes making it difﬁcult to reach a ﬁnal
judgment.
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Vs. Perpetrator category nodes of each party must engage in
a dynamic competition, with one gradually gaining activation
and the other gradually dying off, as they suppress each other’s
activation through inhibition.
Note that the model of a holistic dyad representation does not
mean that the competing traits of the two parties (actor/patient)
have to ﬁrst of all be collapsed through a winner take all mecha-
nism. Rather, it would seem more plausible that in serious moral
dilemmas there are a multitude of representations also at the level
of the dyad, and that the competition takes place at that level as
well. This is naturally accommodated by a connectionist approach.
“Dyad units” represent this domain on various levels of abstrac-
tion. The advantage of this perspective is that it accommodates
complex situations better (e.g., when both sides are both right and
wrong in certain respects).
THE DYADIC PRINCIPLES AND THE FIRST YEAR OF LIFE
How can we judge so easily and effortlessly in so many different
dyads when every dyad is embedded in different contexts and
circumstances?
According to the thesis presented here, infants learn a set of
procedures through the primary dyad that they later apply when
facing real moral situations. What activates, stimulates, and makes
possible, the learning of the complex mechanism involved in
understanding the rules of the dyad?
Here we return to the theories of Bowlby and ethics of care with
regard to the importance of the mother–infant relationship.
I propose that we know so much about dyads because we were
once part of a dyad. Our internal schemas for children, adults,
and the relation between them (→), are rooted in our early expe-
riences. Moral cognitions and feelings draw on and grow out of
such dyadic experiences.
According to the attachment approach, the strict principles
of the primary dyad instantiated within our minds, impose
themselves on the way we perceive and judge conﬂicted situations.
INNATENESS
Darwin (1874), theorized that the social instincts originated in
“parental and ﬁlial affections” (p. 95). Lakoff and Johnson (1999)
write: “Brains tend to optimize on the basis of what they already
have, to add only what is necessary. Over the course of evolution,
newer parts of the brain have built on, taken input from, and
used older parts of the brain.” (p. 43). Is it really plausible to
suggest that if the infant-caregiver system can be put to work in
the service of a parent protecting his child, the brain would build
a new system to duplicate what it could already do in other social
relations?
The representations of dyads and the expectations of how
child–adult dyads should function, might be part of what Carey
(2011) calls innate core cognition. Carey claims that the human
capacity for conceptual understanding beginswith the observation
that evolution provides developmental primitives that are much
richer than the sensorimotor representations that many hypothe-
size are the substrate for all learning. Some of these developmental
primitives are embedded in systems of core cognition. However, in
the absence of experience and learning through interactions with
the environment, this capacity remains dormant.
In order for the genetically determined process to develop
according to its blueprint, there must be an environmental stim-
ulus that’s rich enough to trigger it. In other words, similarly to
language acquisition, the practical experience in the interactions
between the infant and the caregiver does not determine how the
mind will work, but rather triggers it and causes it to operate in a
predetermined way. It’s somewhat like a car: when we turn the key,
the car operates like a car – not a boat – simply because it’s built
like a car. However, if we don’t turn the key, nothing happens. The
interactions between infant and caregiver are required in order to
incorporate moral principle acquisition into the system, but the
interactions don’t determine the content, form, or nature, of the
speciﬁc morality.
Now, let us return to the studies showing that from 3 months of
age, infants signiﬁcantly preferred helpers over hinderers, suggest-
ing the tendency to evaluate others by their third party prosocial
and antisocial acts. These ﬁndings have been interpreted as reﬂect-
ing unlearned innate abilities to discern and show appreciation of
intention and acts in relation to another. In contrast, the attach-
ment model of moral judgment explains these same ﬁndings as
emerging out of the infant’s ability to learn a relation between
dependent (weak, needy, seeking help) and independent (has
resources to help/hinder). This abilitymay be innate (in away sim-
ilar to language competence) but must be triggered by the infant’s
own experience. The infant’s total dependency, his constant bio-
logical and psychological needs, and seeking of help on the one
hand, and the response or failure to respond to his needs on the
other, is the context in which this learning takes place. Caregiver
and infant reciprocally generate the chains and sequences pertain-
ing to their mutual behavior, decipher, identify, and understand
each other’s intentions, and the observing and experiencing infant
learns this sequence, internalizes it, and is able to apply it as a cri-
terion in future contexts. So when a puppet (red circle) attempts
to climb the hill twice, each time falling back to the bottom, and
on the third trial the climber is either bumped up the hill by a
helper or bumped down the hill by a hinderer, the infant sees the
target (red circle) as a “like-me” object who is in need of attain-
ing a goal (climbing the hill). Based on his previous learning with
her caregiver and surroundings the infant expects that animated
objects will actively meet his needs and offer help. The helper
meets the infant’s expectation, an expectation formed and forged
by thousands of positive exchanges between the infant and the
caregiver. An intention to hinder the climber and interfere with
the achievement of the goal violates the infant’s expectations or
reenacts experiences of disappointment thereby leading the infant
to “stay away” from such objects. When infants see others need-
ing to attain a goal, they project that others have the same mental
experience that goes with those behavioral states in the self and
they expect the environment to help, not to hinder.
UNIVERSALITY AND DIVERSITY IN MORAL JUDGMENT
The model has a powerful explanatory power for understanding
the universal component of morality as opposed to the diversity
cultural component.
It is possible that morality, like language, is grounded in two
separate systems: knowledge and performance. Universal moral
knowledge is based on the pre-verbal dyadic laws. This knowledge
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does not refer to any concrete dyad. It is “in our heads” before
it is applied to the external world. It is based on our internal
understanding of the dyad and its organizing principles. The sec-
ond system is a performance system that is designed to apply this
knowledge in the world. The performance system depends on the
speciﬁc environment of the child.
Thus, the principles of the dyad represent the infant’s “starting
point.” It could be thought of as the facet of the human mind that
is responsible for diverse moral judgments having certain univer-
sal features in common. However, the fact that moral judgment
follows a particular dyadic rule tells us little about the speciﬁc
content of the agent’s judgment. Those issues relate to the perfor-
mance system, the way in which we apply and practice the rules of
the dyadic relations.
The “performance” component of our moral psychology is the
functional characterization of the use of the dyadic principles
in the course of construing moral situations out of social data
and producing a moral judgment. Our moral performance can-
not be determined independently of the social relational contexts
in which it takes place. Some behaviors that people perceive as
evil, actually have a moral basis in the psychology of the people
who perform those acts (Rai and Fiske, 2011). For example, the
cultural context determines which groups or people are privileged
to be considered as part of the moral community. Only they will
be construed as dependents in a case of harm. Only their suffering
will activate the mechanisms of concern and empathy.
How can moral knowledge based on dyadic principles be
claimed to be universal when moral systems and values differ so
much from each other?
The dyadic principles, it has to be remembered, are not
intended to be that which is common to all moral systems. These
are principles that are intended to serve as a “toolkit” that a
child acquires in order to learn how right/wrong judgments of
all kinds are reached. It is the platform on which moral judg-
ments are carried out, thought about, and understood. The dyadic
structure itself tells us little about the content of the moral judg-
ment. But it contains all the principles necessary for most moral
judgments in different cultures and among a variety of agents.
The differences among agents are encoded as assigning different
weight to the various components of the dyad. Deciding accord-
ing to which rule one decision will be considered morally superior
to another in a given dyad is a complex matter. For example,
social psychologists found again and again that empathy toward
others probably increases if the “other” is similar to oneself in
terms of ethnicity, gender, age, or cultural background (Wang
et al., 2003). This means that a participant in a dyadic moral
situation can be judged as dependent or child-like only if he
is perceived as like-me in one way or another. Judging the vic-
tim as like-me might inﬂuence dyadic construal by, for example,
exciting all nodes consistent with blame judgments toward the
perceived perpetrator, and inhibiting all nodes inconsistent with
them. Different strategies could be used. For instance, a “victim
like-me” perception can inhibit excitation of child-like features
of the perpetrator and excite the perpetrator’s adult-like features.
The like-me criterion is decisive. However, this criterion is entirely
subjective. It is part of the performance component of moral
judgment.
TESTING THE ATTACHMENT MODEL OF MORAL JUDGMENT
Beyond the model’s ability to explain a wide range of phenomena,
it also gives rise to a number of new and distinctive predictions
which future work could directly examine. Obviously, no exper-
iment can illuminate the whole mental apparatus of our ability
to make right/wrong judgments. Each question has to be broken
down into empirically workable chunks.
Below are a few examples of important predictions derived
from the model.
The model predicts that any given change in one node of the
dyad component (A, C and →) will lead to changes in all other
nodes, as the system works over time to maximally satisfy all of its
constraints in parallel.
This might lead to several interesting predictions:
a) When, within a dyad, there are conﬂicting considerations (for
example, harmnot intended but identiﬁedwith; harmmild but
intended; baby face and intended harm; harm intended to one
but meant to save several other victims) there is considerable
tension between the nodes. This might reduce the system’s
efﬁciency and slow down the process because it will take the
system more time to reach a full gestalt of the dyad.
b) The model predicts that emotions and subjective preference
will greatly inﬂuence the dyadic Gestalt and in speciﬁc ways.
Stereotypes and prejudices against certain parties might block
attributions of child-like qualities, exaggerate the perceived
intention of wrongdoers, and reduce the perceived damage
to victims.
c) The model predicts that a deep moral component based on
the dyadic gestalt will be uniformly found in the structure of
all moral judgments. For example, if, in a traditional culture,
honor killing is permitted and encouraged, then the child-
like quality of the victims will be less salient than in western
culture. The same will be true for the adult-like quality of the
perpetrator.
CONCLUSION
I have described a rather basic hypothetical model for what is
surely a rich and complex phenomenon. I suggest that the attach-
ment approach to moral judgment has several features that make
it especially attractive as a guide for research in moral psychology.
First, it holds that moral judgments are underpinned by inter-
nally represented principles or rules. Like sentimentalist accounts,
the current model accepts that emotions, intuitions and uncon-
scious processes, are central to the making of moral judgment.
The added value of the attachment approach is that it speciﬁes
in detail what exactly goes on “in our head” when we follow our
moral intuitions and how the entire procedure relates to cognitive
processes. The intuitions and emotions behind moral judgments
are rule based. By rules, I mean inferential devices for categoriza-
tion, estimation, paired comparisons, and other judgmental tasks
that go beyond the information given. The rule concept denotes an
if–then relation of the type if (cues) then (judgment) (Kruglanski
and Gigerenzer, 2011). One of the rules we use in judging moral
situations is: if a party is perceived to be child-like (cues) then
we judge that party as less accountable, less reprehensible, less
responsible, less wrathful and so on.
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Second, the important thing is that the rules apply to whole
relations, not to speciﬁc harmful acts. We don’t judge an act as
wrongdoing; we judge an entire relationship, a dyad. Wrongdoings
are violations of our expectations of independents. Acts are judged
as transgressions when an observer evaluates or senses that a dyad
went wrong, violated an expected contingency.
Given the limited researchbase, thismodel – although reﬂecting
available research evidence – serves primarily a heuristic function.
I hope, nonetheless, that the model will inspire researchers to
gain more empirical data on the mechanisms through which early
attachment relations modulate moral judgments.
A deeper integration betweenmoral knowledge,moral practice,
emotions and cognitions, will require more explicit modeling and
more empirical data, including neurobiology data on the mecha-
nisms through which early attachment relations modulate moral
judgments.
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